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Addressing Implicit Bias
in the Courts
Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren, Fred L. Cheesman, & Jennifer K. Elek1

Fairness is a fundamental tenet of American courts. Yet,
despite substantial work by state courts to address issues of
racial and ethnic fairness,2 public skepticism that racial and
ethnic minorities receive consistently fair and equal treatment
in American courts remains widespread.3 Why?

Perhaps one explanation may be found in an emerging body
of research on implicit cognition. During the last two decades,
new assessment methods and technologies in the fields of
social science and neuroscience have advanced research on
brain functions, providing a glimpse into what National Public
Radio science correspondent Shankar Vedantam refers to as
the “hidden brain.”4 Although in its early stages, this research
is helping scientists understand how the brain takes in, sorts,
synthesizes, and responds to the enormous amount of information an individual faces on a daily basis.5 It also is providing intriguing insights into how and why individuals develop
stereotypes and biases, often without even knowing they exist.
The research indicates that an individual’s brain learns over
time how to distinguish different objects (e.g., a chair or desk)
based on features of the objects that coalesce into patterns.

These patterns or schemas help the brain efficiently recognize
objects encountered in the environment. What is interesting is
that these patterns also operate at the social level. Over time,
the brain learns to sort people into certain groups (e.g., male or
female, young or old) based on combinations of characteristics
as well. The problem is when the brain automatically associates certain characteristics with specific groups that are not
accurate for all the individuals in the group (e.g., “elderly individuals are frail”). Scientists refer to these automatic associations as implicit—they operate behind-the-scenes without the
individual’s awareness.
Scientists have developed a variety of methods to measure
these implicit attitudes about different groups, but the most
common measure used is reaction time (e.g., the Implicit
Association Test, or IAT).6 The idea behind these types of measures is that individuals will react faster to two stimuli that are
strongly associated (e.g., elderly and frail) than to two stimuli
that are less strongly associated (e.g., elderly and robust). In
the case of race, scientists have found that most European
Americans who have taken the test are faster at pairing a white
face with a good word (e.g., honest) and a black face with a bad
word (e.g., violent) than the other way around. For African-

Footnotes
1. The Open Society Institute, the State Justice Institute, and the
National Center for State Courts funded the preparation of this
article. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations. This
article summarizes the National Center for State Courts’ project
on implicit bias and judicial education. For the full report of the
project, see PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN, FRED L.
CHEESMAN II & JENNIFER K. ELEK, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT
BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012) (hereinafter HELPING
COURTS), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.
ashx.
2. Various state-court reports of racial fairness task forces and commissions can be found through the National Center for State
Courts’ website at http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/
REFI/SearchState.asp. To access the National Center for State
Courts’ Interactive Database of State Programs to address race and
ethnic fairness in the courts, go to http://www.ncsconline.org
/D_Research/ref/programs.asp.
3. For example, a 1999 a national survey of public attitudes about
state courts that found 47% of Americans surveyed did not believe
that African-Americans and Latinos receive equal treatment in
America’s state courts, 55% did not believe that non-Englishspeaking persons receive equal treatment, and more than twothirds of African-Americans thought that African-Americans
received worse treatment than others in court. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE
COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC_Public

ViewCrtsPub.pdf. State surveys, such as the public-opinion survey commissioned by the California Administrative Office of the
Courts, report similar findings: A majority of all California
respondents stated that African-Americans and Latinos usually
receive less favorable results in court than others, approximately
two-thirds believed that non-English speakers receive less favorable results, and, a much higher proportion of African-Americans,
87%, thought that African-Americans receive unequal treatment.
See David B. Rottman, Trust and Confidence in the California
Courts: A Survey of the Public and Attorneys (2005), available at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-in/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ ctcomm&CISOPTR=25.
4. See SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR
UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT PRESIDENTS, CONTROL MARKETS, WAGE
WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES (2010).
5. Social-science research on implicit stereotypes, attitudes, and bias
has accumulated across several decades into a compelling body of
knowledge and continues to be a robust area of inquiry, but the
research is not without its critics. See HELPING COURTS, supra note
1, Appendix B (“What Are the Key Criticisms of Implicit Bias
Research?”). There is much that scientists do not yet know. This
article and the full report on which it is based are offered as a starting point for courts interested in exploring implicit bias and
potential remedies, with the understanding that advances in technology and neuroscience promise continued refinement of knowledge about implicit bias and its effects on decision making and
behavior.
6. See HELPING COURTS, supra note 1, Appendix B (“How Is Implicit
Bias Measured”), for more information on measures of implicit
bias.
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Americans, approximately a third show a preference for
African-Americans, a third show a preference for European
Americans, and a third show no preference.7
There is evidence that judges are susceptible to these
implicit associations, too. One survey of judges found a strong
white preference on the IAT among white judges. Black judges
also followed the general population findings, showing no
clear preference overall (44% showed a white preference but
the preference was weaker overall).8
The question is whether these implicit associations can
influence, i.e., bias, an individual’s decisions and actions, and
there is growing evidence that the answer is yes. Research has
demonstrated that implicit bias can affect decisions regarding,
for example, job applicants,9 medical treatment,10 a suspect’s
dangerousness,11 and nominees for elected office.12
Law professor Jerry Kang gave this description of the potential problem this poses for the justice system:
Though our shorthand schemas of people may be
helpful in some situations, they also can lead to discriminatory behaviors if we are not careful. Given the
critical importance of exercising fairness and equality in
the court system, lawyers, judges, jurors, and staff
should be particularly concerned about identifying such
possibilities. Do we, for instance, associate aggressiveness with Black men, such that we see them as more
likely to have started the fight than to have responded in
self-defense?13
The problem is compounded by judges and other court professionals who, because they have worked hard to eliminate
explicit bias in their own decisions and behaviors, assume that
they do not allow racial prejudice to color their judgments. For
example, most, if not all, judges believe that they are fair and
objective and base their decisions only on the facts of a case (in
one study, for example, 97% of judges attending an educational
program rated themselves in the top half of the attendees—statistically impossible—in their ability to “avoid racial prejudice

7. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda H. Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 956-58 (2006).
8. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich,
& Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1209-11 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhi L. Mullainathan, Are Emily
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON. REV.
991 (2004); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment
Discrimination: The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a
Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 553 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin,
Long H. Ngo, Kristal L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni, & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of
Thombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007).
11. See Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, & Bernard
Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 1314 (2002); Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park,
Charles M. Judd, Bernard Wittenbrink, Melody S. Sadler, & Tracie

in decisionmaking”14). Judges and court professionals who
focus only on eliminating explicit bias may conclude that they
are better at understanding and controlling for bias in their
decisions and actions than they really are.
Law professor and social psychologist Jeffrey Rachlinski,
Judge Andrew Wistrich, and law professors Chris Guthrie and
Sheri Lynn Johnson also found preliminary evidence that
implicit bias affected judges’ sentences. Additional research is
needed to confirm these findings. More importantly for the
justice system, though, is their conclusion that “when judges
are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the
influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”15 The next section
discusses potential strategies judges and court professionals
can use to address implicit bias.
REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS

Compared to the science on the existence of implicit bias
and its potential influence on behavior, the science on ways to
mitigate implicit bias is relatively young and often does not
address specific applied contexts such as judicial decision
making. Yet, it is important for strategies to be concrete and
applicable to an individual’s work to be effective; instructions
to simply avoid biased outcomes or respond in an egalitarian
manner are too vague to be helpful.16 To address this gap in
concrete strategies applicable to court audiences, the authors
reviewed the science on general strategies to address implicit
bias and considered their potential relevance for judges and
court professionals. They also convened a small-group discussion with judges and judicial educators (referred to here as the
Judicial Focus Group) to discuss potential strategies. These
efforts yielded seven general research-based strategies that may
help attenuate implicit bias or mitigate the influence of
implicit bias on decisions and actions.17
Strategy 1: Raise awareness of implicit bias. Individuals can
only work to correct for sources of bias that they are aware

Keesee, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1006
(2007).
12. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Colin T. Smith, N. Sriram, Yoav BarAnan, & Brian A. Nosek, Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in
the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, 9 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB.
POL’Y 241 (2009); B. Keith Payne, Jon A. Krosnick, Josh Pasek,
Yphtach Leikes, Omair Ahktar, & Trevor Thompson, Implicit and
Explicit Prejudice in the 2008 American Presidential Election, 46 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 367 (2010).
13. JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 2 (NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS 2009).
14. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1225-26.
15. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1221.
16. See Nilanjana Dasgupta, David DeSteno, Lisa A. Williams, &
Matthew Hunsinger, Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence
of Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585
(2009).
17. For more information about the strategies, see HELPING COURTS,
supra note 1, Appendix G.
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Strategy 1:
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Seek information
on implicit bias by attending
educational sessions, taking
the IAT, and reading relevant
research.
• Courts: Provide education on
implicit bias that includes
judicial facilitators/presenters, examples of implicit
bias across other professions, and exercises to make
the material more personally
relevant.

exist.18 Simply knowing
about implicit bias and its
potentially harmful effects on
judgment and behavior may
prompt individuals to pursue
corrective action.19 Although
awareness of implicit bias in
and of itself is not sufficient
to ensure that effective debiasing efforts take place,20 it
is a crucial starting point that
may prompt individuals to
seek out and implement
additional strategies.

Strategy 2:
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Participate in
diversity training that
focuses on multiculturalism,
associate with those committed to egalitarian goals,
and invest effort in identifying the unique characteristics of different members of
the same minority groups.
• Courts: Provide routine
diversity training that
emphasizes multiculturalism
and encourage court leaders to promote egalitarian
behavior as part of a
court’s culture.

ports egalitarian norms is
important in reducing individual-level implicit bias.
Note, however, that mandatory training or other imposed
pressure to comply with egalitarian standards may elicit
hostility and resistance from
some types of individuals,
failing to reduce implicit
bias.25
In addition to considering
and acknowledging group differences, individuals should
purposely compare and individuate stigmatized group
members. By defining individuals in multiple ways other
than in terms of race, implicit
bias may be reduced.26

Strategy 2: Seek to identify
and consciously acknowledge real group and individual differences. The popular “color blind” approach to
egalitarianism (i.e., avoiding or ignoring race; lack of awareness of and sensitivity to differences between social groups)
fails as an implicit-bias intervention strategy. “Color blindness”
actually produces greater implicit bias than strategies that
acknowledge race.21 Cultivating greater awareness of and sensitivity to group and individual differences appears to be a
more effective tactic: Training seminars that acknowledge and
promote an appreciation of group differences and multicultural viewpoints can help reduce implicit bias.22
Diversity-training seminars can serve as a starting point
from which court culture itself can change. When respected
court leadership actively supports the multiculturalism
approach, those egalitarian goals can influence others.23
Moreover, when an individual (e.g., a new employee) discovers that peers in the court community are more egalitarian, the
individual’s beliefs become less implicitly biased.24 Thus, a system-wide effort to cultivate a workplace environment that sup-

Strategy 3: Routinely check thought processes and decisions for possible bias. When individuals engage in loweffort information processing, they rely on stereotypes and produce more stereotype-consistent judgments than when
engaged in more deliberative, effortful processing.
(Bodenhausen, 1990). As a result, low-effort decision makers
tend to develop inferences or expectations about an individual
early on in the information-gathering process. These expectations then guide subsequent information processing:
Attention and subsequent recall are biased in favor of stereotype-confirming evidence and produce biased judgment.27
Expectations can also affect social interaction between the
decision maker (e.g., judge) and the stereotyped target (e.g.,
defendant), causing the decision maker to behave in ways that
inadvertently elicit stereotype-confirming behavior from the

18. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination
and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and
Evaluations, 116 PSYCH. BULL. 117 (1994).
19. Cf. Green et al., supra note 10, at 1237 (finding support for the
IAT as an educational tool because most resident physicians were
“open to the idea that unconscious biases could affect their clinical decisions, and that learning more about these biases could
improve their care of patients” and that physicians who were
aware of the study’s focus seemed to modulate the effects of
implicit bias on their treatment decisions).
20. See Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), 66 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 83 (2003).
21. See Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I. Norton,
Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness
in Social Interaction. 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 918 (2008).
22. See Laurie A. Rudman, Richard D. Ashmore, & Melvin L. Gary,
“Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 856
(2001); Richard J. Nussbaum & Jennifer A. Richeson, The Impact
of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindedness on Racial Bias, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 417 (2004).
23. See Henk Aarts, Peter M. Gollwitzer, & Ran R. Hassin, Goal

Contagion: Perceiving Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 23 (2004).
24. See Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus
Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 645 (2001).
25. See E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses to OtherImposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 486 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Maja Djikic, J. Ellen Langer, & Sarah F. Stapleton,
Reducing Stereotyping Through Mindfulness: Effects on Automatic
Stereotype-Activated Behaviors, 15 J. ADULT DEV. 106 (2008);
Sophie Lebrecht, Lara J. Pierce, Michael J. Tarr, & James W.
Tanaka, Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial
Bias, 4 PLOS ONE 4, e4215 (2009); Katja Corcoran, Tanja
Hundhammer, & Thomas Mussweiler, A Tool for Thought! When
Cooperative Thinking Reduces Stereotyping Effects, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1008 (2009).
27. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics:
Evidence of Circadian Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCH. SCI.
319 (1990); John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A HypothesisConfirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 20 (1983).
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other person.28 Individuals
interested in minimizing the
impact of implicit bias on
their own judgment and
• Individual: Use decision-support tools such as note-taking, behaviors should actively
engage in more thoughtful,
checklists, and bench cards
deliberative
information
and techniques such as writprocessing. When sufficient
ing down the reasons for a
effort is exerted to limit the
judgment to promote greater
effects of implicit biases on
deliberative as opposed to
judgment, attempts to conintuitive thinking.
sciously control implicit bias
• Courts: Develop guidelines
can be successful.29
and/or formal protocols for
To do this, however, indidecision makers to check and
viduals must possess a cercorrect for implicit bias (e.g.,
tain degree of self-awaretaking the other person’s perness. They must be mindful
spective, imagining the person is from a non-stigmatized of their decision-making
processes rather than just
social group, thinking of
counter-stereotypic thoughts in the results of decision makthe presence of an individual
ing30 to eliminate distracfrom a minority social group). tions, to minimize emotional decision making, and
to objectively and deliberatively consider the facts at hand
instead of relying on schemas, stereotypes, and/or intuition.
Strategy 3:
Potential Actions to Take

Strategy 4: Identify distractions and sources of stress in the
decision-making environment and remove or reduce them.
Tiring (e.g., long hours, fatigue), stressful (e.g., heavy, backlogged, or very diverse caseloads; loud construction noise;
threats to physical safety; popular or political pressure about a
particular decision; emergency or crisis situations), or otherwise
distracting circumstances can adversely affect judicial performance.31 Specifically, situations that involve time pressure32 that
force a decision maker to form complex judgments relatively

28. See Carl O. Word, Mark P. Zanna, & Joel Cooper, The Nonverbal
Mediation of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial
Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 553 (2005).
29. See B. Keith Payne, Conceptualizing Control in Social Cognition:
How Executive Functioning Modulates the Expression of Automatic
Stereotyping, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 488 (2005);
Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic
Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient
Means of Thought Control, 34 PERSONALITY & PSYCH. BULL. 1332
(2008).
30. See Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe:
Practical Methods for Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Bias, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2006).
31. See, e.g., Tracy D. Eells & Robert C. Showalter, Work-Related Stress
in American Trial Judges, 22 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 71
(1994); L.R. Hartley & R.G. Adams, Effect of Noise on the Stroop
Test, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 62 (1974); Giora Keinan,
Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under
Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 639 (1987).
32. See, e.g., Ad van Knippenberg, Ap Dijksterhuis, & Diane
Vermeulen, Judgment and Memory of a Criminal Act: The Effects of
Stereotypes and Cognitive Load, 29 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCH. 191 (1999).

quickly33 or in which the decision maker is distracted and
cannot fully attend to incoming information34 all limit the
• Individual: Allow more time
ability to fully process case
on cases in which implicit
bias might be a concern by, information. Decision makers
for example, spending more who are rushed, stressed, distracted, or pressured are more
time reviewing the facts of
likely to apply stereotypes –
the case before committing
recalling facts in ways biased
to a decision; consider
by stereotypes and making
ways to clear your mind
more stereotypic judgments –
(e.g., through meditation)
and focus completely on the than decision makers whose
cognitive abilities are not simtask at hand.
ilarly constrained. A decision• Courts: Review areas in
maker may be more likely to
which judges and other
decision makers are likely to think in terms of race and use
implicit racial stereotypes35
be over-burdened and conbecause race often is a salient,
sider options (e.g., reorgai.e., easily-accessible, attribute.
nizing court calendars) for
modifying procedures to
In addition, certain emotional
provide more time for decistates (anger, disgust) can
sion making.
exacerbate implicit bias in
judgments of stigmatized
group members, even if the
source of the negative emotion has nothing to do with the current situation or with the issue of social groups or stereotypes
more broadly.36 Happiness may also produce more stereotypic
judgments, though this can be consciously controlled if the person is motivated to do so.37
Given all these potential distractions and sources of stress,
decision makers need enough time and cognitive resources to
thoroughly process case information to avoid relying on intuitive reasoning processes that can result in biased judgments.
Strategy 4:
Potential Actions to Take

33. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen & Meryl Lichtenstein, Social
Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies: The Impact of
Task Complexity, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 871 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of
Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 509 (1991); Jeffrey W. Sherman,
Angela Y. Lee, Gayle R. Bessenoff, & Leigh A. Frost, Stereotype
Efficiency Reconsidered: Encoding Flexibility Under Cognitive Load,
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 589 (1998).
35. See C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Godehausen, & Alan B. Milne, The
Dissection of Selection in Person Perception: Inhibitory Processes in
Social Stereotyping, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 397 (1995);
Jason P. Mitchell, Brian A. Nosek, & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCH.: GEN. 455 (2003).
36. See, e.g., Dasgupta et al., supra note 16; David DeSteno, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett, & Aida Cajdric, Prejudice from Thin
Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes, 15
PSYCH. SCI. 319 (2004).
37. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Geoffrey P. Kramer, & Karin Susser
Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 621 (1994).
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Strategy
5:
Identify
sources of ambiguity in the
decision-making context
and establish more con• Individual: Commit to decicrete standards before
sion-making criteria before
engaging in the decisionreviewing case-specific informaking process. When the
mation .
basis for judgment is some• Courts: Develop protocols
what vague (e.g., situations
that identify potential sources
that call for discretion; cases
of ambiguity; consider the
that involve the application
pros (e.g., more understandof new, unfamiliar laws),
ing of issues) and cons (e.g.,
biased judgments are more
familiarity may lead to less
likely.
Without more
deliberative processing) of
explicit, concrete criteria for
using judges with special
decision making, individuexpertise to handle cases
als tend to disambiguate the
with greater ambiguity.
situation using whatever
information is most easily accessible—including stereotypes.38
In cases involving ambiguous factors, decision makers
should preemptively commit to specific decision-making criteria (e.g., the importance of various types of evidence to the
decision) before hearing a case or reviewing evidence to minimize the opportunity for implicit bias.39 Establishing this
structure before entering the decision-making context will
help prevent constructing criteria after the fact in ways biased
by implicit stereotypes but rationalized by specific types of evidence (e.g., placing greater weight on stereotype-consistent
evidence in a case against a black defendant than one would in
a case against a white defendant).
Strategy 5:
Potential Actions to Take

Strategy 6: Institute feedback mechanisms. Providing egalitarian consensus information (i.e., information that others in
the court hold egalitarian beliefs rather than adhere to stereotypic beliefs) and other feedback mechanisms can be powerful
tools in promoting more egalitarian attitudes and behavior in
the court community. To encourage individual effort in
addressing personal implicit biases, court administration may
opt to provide judges and other court professionals with relevant performance feedback. As part of this process, court
administration should consider the type of judicial decision-

38. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism
and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 Psych. Sci. 315, 318
(2000); James D. Johnson, Erik Whitestone, Lee Anderson
Jackson & Leslie Gatto, Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential
Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 Personality & Soc.
Psych. Bull. 893 896-98 (1995).
39. See Eric L. Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria:
Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 Psych. Sci. 474
(2005).
40. See, e.g., Leanne S. Son Hing, Winnie Li, & Mark P. Zanna,
Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Response Among Aversive
Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 71 (2002).
41. Cf. Saaid A. Mendoza, Peter M. Gollwitzer, & David M. Amodio,
Reducing the Expression of Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control
Through Implementation Intentions, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 512 (2010) at 512 (finding that study participants given

68 Court Review - Volume 49

making data currently available or easily obtained that
would offer judges meaningful but nonthreatening feed• Individual: Seek feedback
back on demonstrated
through, for example, particibiases. Transparent feedback
pating in a sentencing round
from regular or intermittent
table discussing hypothetical
peer reviews that raise percases or consulting with a
skilled mentor or senior judge sonal awareness of biases
could prompt those with
about handling challenging
egalitarian motives to do
cases; ask for feedback from
more to prevent implicit
colleagues, supervisors and
bias in future decisions and
others regarding past performance; document and review actions.40 This feedback
should include concrete
the underlying logic of decisuggestions on how to
sions to ensure their soundimprove performance41 and
ness.
• Courts: Periodically review a could also involve recognition of those individuals
judge’s case materials and
who display exceptional
provide feedback and suggestions for improvement as
fairness as positive reinneeded; develop a bench-bar forcement.
committee to oversee an inforFeedback tends to work
mal internal grievance
best when it (a) comes from
process and work with judges a
legitimate, respected
as needed; convene sentencauthority, (b) addresses the
ing round tables to discuss
person’s decision-making
hypothetical cases involving
process rather than simply
implicit bias issues and
the decision outcome, and
encourage more deliberate
(c) when provided before
thinking.
the person commits to a
decision rather than afterwards, when he or she has already committed to a particular
course of action.42 Note, however, that feedback mechanisms
that apply coercive pressure to comply with egalitarian standards can elicit hostility from some types of individuals and
fail to mitigate implicit bias.43 By inciting hostility, these
imposed standards may even be counterproductive to egalitarian goals, generating backlash in the form of increased explicit
and implicit prejudice.44
Strategy 6:
Potential Actions to Take

instructions to develop specific implementation intentions—in
which a specific behavioral response is linked to an anticipated
situational cue—demonstrated improved performance accuracy
and less implicit stereotyping in the Shooter Task, a reaction time
measure of implicit bias, compared to participants who were simply prompted with a general accuracy goal); Kim, supra note 20 at
91 (finding that study participants given specific instructions for
trying to fake the results of an IAT were more successful than participants given no or only general instructions for faking results).
42. For a review on feedback effects, see Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E.
Tetlock, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 255 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Plant & Devine, supra note 25.
44. See Lisa Legault, Jennifer N. Gutsell, & Michael Inzlicht, Ironic
Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions
Can Reduce (But Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1472
(2011).

Strategy 7: Increase exposure to stigmatized group
members and counterstereotypes and reduce
• Individual: View images
(e.g., by hanging photos, cre- exposure to stereotypes.
Increased contact with
ating new screen savers and
counter-stereotypes—specifdesk top images) of admired
ically, increased exposure to
individuals (e.g., Martin
stigmatized group members
Luther King, Jr.) of the stereothat contradict the social
typed social group; spend
stereotype—can help indimore time with individuals
viduals negate stereotypes,
who are counter-stereotypic
affirm counter-stereotypes,
role models; practice making
and “unlearn” the associapositive, i.e., counter-stereotypic, associations, with mem- tions that underlie implicit
bias. “Exposure” can include
bers of minority social
imagining counter-stereogroups.
types,45 incidentally observ• Courts: Assess visual and
ing counter-stereotypes in
auditory communications for
the environment,46 engaging
implicit bias and modify to
convey egalitarian norms and with
counter-stereotypic
present counter-stereotypic
role models,47 or extensive
information; increase reprepractice making countersentation of stigmatized
stereotypic associations.48
social groups in valued,
For individuals who seek
authoritative roles in the court greater
contact
with
to foster positive intergroup
counter-stereotypic individrelations and provide immedi- uals, such contact is more
ately accessible countereffective when the counterstereotype examples.
stereotype is of at least equal
status in the workplace.49
Moreover, positive and meaningful interactions work best:
Cooperation is one of the most powerful forms of debiasing
contact.50
In addition to greater contact with counter-stereotypes,
this strategy also involves decreased exposure to stereotypes.
Certain environmental cues can automatically trigger stereotype activation and implicit bias. Images and language that
are a part of any signage, pamphlets, brochures, instructional

manuals, background music, or any other verbal or visual
communications in the court may inadvertently activate
implicit biases because they convey stereotypic information.51 Identifying these communications and removing them
or replacing them with non-stereotypic or counter-stereotypic information can help decrease the amount of daily
exposure court employees and other legal professionals have
with the types of social stereotypes that underlie implicit
bias.

45. See Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma, & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining
Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through
Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 828 (2001).
46. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combatting Automatic Prejudice
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 800 (2001); Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio,
Reducing Automatically Activated Racial Prejudice Through Implicit
Evaluative Conditioning, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 421
(2006).
47. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context
Matters: The Influence of Long-Term Contract and Short-Term
Exposure to Admired Group Members on Implicit Attitudes and
Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 54 (2008); Nilanjana
Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability
of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
642 (2004).
48. See Kerry Kawakami, John F. Dovidio, Jasper Moll, Sander
Hermsen, & Abby Russin, Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of

Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype
Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 871 (2000).
49. See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of
Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 751
(2006).
50. See, e.g., MUZAFER SHERIF, O.J. HARVEY, B. JACK WHITE, WILLIAM R.
HOOD, & CAROLYN W. SHERIF, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT (1961 ed.).
51. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic
and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 5
(1989); Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit
Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133 (2002). For examples of
how such communications can prime stereotypic actions and
judgments, see JERRY KANG & MAHZARIN R. BANAJI, FAIR MEASURES:
A BEHAVIORAL REALIST REVISION OF “AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” (2006).
52. See Devine, supra note 51.
53. Devine, supra note 51, at 16.
54. Bridget M. Law, Retraining the Biased Brain, 42 MONITOR ON PSYCH.
42, 43 (2011).

Strategy 7:
Potential Actions to Take

CONCLUSION

Research shows that individuals develop implicit attitudes
and stereotypes as a routine process of sorting and categorizing the vast amounts of sensory information they encounter on
an ongoing basis. Implicit, as opposed to explicit, attitudes and
stereotypes operate automatically, without awareness, intent,
or conscious control, and can operate even in individuals who
express low explicit bias.52 Because implicit biases are automatic, they can influence or bias decisions and behaviors, both
positively and negatively, without an individual’s awareness.
This phenomenon leaves open the possibility that even those
dedicated to the principles of a fair justice system may, at
times, unknowingly make crucial decisions and act in ways
that are unintentionally unfair. Thus although courts may have
made great strides in eliminating explicit or consciously
endorsed racial bias, they, like all social institutions, may still
be challenged by implicit biases that are more difficult to identify and change.
Psychology professor Patricia Devine argues that “prejudice
need not be the consequence of ordinary thought processes” if
individuals actively take steps to avoid the influence of implicit
biases on their behavior.53 Avoiding the influence of implicit
bias, however, is an effortful, as opposed to automatic, process
and requires intention, attention, and time. Combating implicit
bias, much like combating any habit, involves “becoming aware
of one’s implicit bias, being concerned about the consequences
of the bias, and learning to replace the biased response with
non-prejudiced responses—ones that more closely match the
values people consciously believe that they hold.”54
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Once judges and court professionals become aware of
implicit bias, examples of strategies they can use to help combat it and encourage egalitarianism are:
• Consciously acknowledge group and individual differences (i.e., adopt a multiculturalism approach to
egalitarianism rather than a color-blindness strategy
in which one tries to ignore these differences);
• Routinely check thought processes and decisions for
possible bias (i.e., adopt a thoughtful, deliberative,
and self-aware process for inspecting how one’s decisions are made);
• Identify sources of stress and reduce them in the decision-making environment;
• Identify sources of ambiguity and impose greater
structure in the decision-making context;
• Institute feedback mechanisms; and
• Increase exposure to stereotyped group members
(e.g., seek out greater contact with the stigmatized
group in a positive context).
Those dedicated to the principles of a fair justice system
who have worked to eliminate explicit bias from the system
and in their own decisions and behaviors may nonetheless be
influenced by implicit bias. Providing information on implicit
bias offers judges and court staff an opportunity to explore this
possibility and to consider strategies to address it. It also provides an opportunity to engage judges and court professionals
in a dialog on broader race and ethnic fairness issues in a
thoughtful and constructive manner:
Recognizing that implicit bias appears to be relatively
universal provides an interesting foundation for broadening discussions on issues such as minority over-representation, disproportionate minority contact, and gender or age discrimination. In essence, when we look at
research on social cognitive processes such as implicit
bias we understand that these processes are normal
rather than pathological. This does not mean we should
use them as an excuse for prejudice or discrimination.
Rather, they give us insight into how we might go about
avoiding the pitfalls we face when some of our information processing functions outside of our awareness.55

55. Shawn Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, 18 JUV. & FAMILY J. TODAY
16, 18 (2009)(acronyms omitted).
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